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Abstract 
 
The Affordable Care Act founded the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
with the purpose of performing comparative effectiveness research (CER) on treatments for the 
most common and widespread conditions. Advocates believe the founding of this institute marks 
a “turning point” for CER (Dentzer 2010), but others disagree, and the road to this point was 
paved with political speedbumps and stakeholder concerns. 
This paper explores the political difficulties faced by CER throughout its history and 
attempts to elucidate the variables that came together for CER prior to the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act. The paper uses a search of the gray literature generated by policy 
stakeholders during the debate about CER, and in-depth interviews with knowledgeable key 
stakeholders engaged in CER policy.    
At present, federal CER activity will be housed in the Patient-Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute (PCORI).  My analysis of the gray literature and synthesis of stakeholder 
perspectives suggest that CER’s future is cautiously optimistic.  On the positive side, 
proponents of PCORI succeeded in placing it outside of the government agency hierarchy and 
the appropriations process.  On the negative side, CER cannot realize its promise unless 
PCORI’s work is allowed to be connected to cost and coverage.   
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Preface 
 
 
This paper is meant to be an analysis of the debate surrounding comparative 
effectiveness research (CER), written from the perspective of a student in medicine and public 
health.  I chose the topic of CER because I believe in the power of scientific evidence broadly 
and in the push for more evidence-based medicine more specifically. I was originally confused 
as to why CER had not played a more prominent role in American health care, and I was 
further flummoxed by the manner in which industry leaders and organizations representing 
physician interests were not only reluctant but also able to successfully lobby against the 
funding of federal agencies performing CER. During the course of my research, I came to a 
better understanding of the opposition’s concern about how CER might be performed and 
used. 
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History Behind the Current Debate About CER 
 
It was first cost and then second an understanding of a lack of evidence and that that 
lack of evidence or a lack of implementation of evidence was driving variations in 
practice. And that was not improving health outcomes. 
- Bart Barefoot, Director of Public Policy, GlaxoSmithKline 
Federally supported research into the effectiveness of different treatments began in the 
late 1980’s with sponsorship from the National Center for Health Services Research (NCHSR), 
the first predecessor of today’s Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research (AHRQ). This 
research, however, was limited in scope until stakeholders seized upon the idea that it might 
limit the rising costs of the American health care system. To that end, one of the most important 
influences on CER’s rise might be John Wennberg. His research on practice variations 
suggested the inappropriate use of common surgical procedures and provided the opportunity 
to link the CER agenda to issues for which “an important constituency already existed on 
Capitol Hill” (Gray, Gusmano & Collins 2003, 286). Specifically, federal support for CER grew 
from the concern that geographic variations in medical care were inefficient, unwarranted, and 
contributing to increasing costs of care (Epstein 1990; Wood 1990; Mitchell & Durenberger 
1990, Gray, Gusmano & Collins 2003, Marwick 1990). Proponents of CER suggested that it 
would inform doctors as to which type of care was most effective for a given disease or 
condition, thus combatting such inefficiencies (Gornick, Lubitz & Riley, 1991, Mitchell & 
Durenberger 1990, Wood 1990).  
CER’s rise to the national agenda was reflected in the actions of legislators in 1989, who 
introduced four separate bills suggesting increased funding for effectiveness research (Mitchell 
& Durenberger 1990). The legislation that eventually emerged, in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA), transformed the NCHSR into the Agency for Health Care 
Policy and Research (AHCPR), AHRQ’s immediately proximate predecessor. OBRA gave 
AHCPR (rather than the weaker center) status within the Department of Health and Human 
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Services and gave it a larger budget authorization, with $50 million set aside in the first year 
specifically for effectiveness and guidelines research (Mitchell & Durenberger 1990). OBRA also 
reflected the expectation that the AHCPR would use its outcomes research to change medical 
practice (Gray, Gusmano & Collins 2003). In general, this marked the beginning of a successful 
period for the AHCPR in general and CER specifically in which funding continued to increase 
from 1991 to 1995 (Gray, Gusmano & Collins 2003). 
In 1995, however, the AHCPR nearly lost its funding, when a group of orthopedic 
surgeons, disturbed by AHCPR’s back pain guideline, almost succeeded in convincing a 
number of Republicans to “zero out” the agency’s budget. The orthopedists were upset by the 
guideline’s recommendation against back surgery in most cases of simple back pain, and their 
goal was to "eliminate funding for the AHCPR and [curtail] the powers of the Food and Drug 
Administration" (Deyo 1997, 1176). A similar effort was undertaken by other organizations in 
response to the AHCPR’s research contesting the diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity in 
general and various immunological diagnostic tests specifically.  
The efforts of these and similar groups resulted in AHCPR’s inability to continue to 
develop explicit treatment guidelines (as opposed to “evidence reports,” which the Agency still 
sponsors).  Some three years later, in 1999, the agency changed its name, dropping “policy,” 
once again in response to Republican congressional distaste for government intervention into 
treatment recommendations.  In the years following AHRQ’s “near death experience,” CER 
remained on the national agenda to one degree or another. Various proposals included 
provisions for funding CER, and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act of 2003 authorized $50 million for AHRQ1 to perform CER, returning funding 
to its previous level (108th Congress). This research, however, was described by some as 
“limited” in nature (Wilensky 2009, 724), and as the overall costs of health care in the U.S. grew, 
so did interest in supporting CER (Wilensky 2006). 
                                                          
1
 Of the authorized amount, only $15 million was appropriated for CER in fiscal year 2004 (Wilensky 2006) 
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The volume of the debate about CER increased significantly when President Obama 
signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which set aside $1.1 billion for CER 
research.  In the following weeks and months, various groups spoke out against increased 
funding for CER. Drug and device developers worried that CER and subsequent changes in 
reimbursement and coverage would threaten future biomedical innovation (Iglehart 2009). 
Medical professional groups worried that CER would lead to guidelines that would serve as an 
imposition between doctor and patient (Gerber, Patashnik et al 2010, Turner 2009). Patient 
interest groups worried that CER would not take into account heterogeneous response to 
medications and thus would lead to less individualized care (Jacobson 2007). And conservative 
pundits saw CER as a stepping stone to the rationing of health care (Avorn 2009). These 
concerns were marketed and eventually crossed traditional ideological lines to be reflected in 
less historically conservative groups (Jacobson 2007, Iglehart 2010).  
Nevertheless, the Affordable Care Act increased funding for CER, and a new institution 
– the Patient Centered-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORII) – was established to 
perform and coordinate CER research. This paper aims to reach a better understanding of how 
this occurred and how it will affect health care in the future.  
 
  
The Role of Stakeholders in the Debate About CER 
 
 The current approach to research operates within the context of previous public policy 
theory and practice. At the most basic level, this research is an example of Kingdon’s (1984) 
theory of multiple-streams of problems, policies and politics flowing independently through 
political institutions and periods. In this theory, none of the streams necessarily presents a new 
problem, policy or political situation, but occasionally they merge to provide windows of 
opportunity in which governments can enact a specific policy to solve a particular problem. I use 
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Kingdon’s theory to describe the problem of the rising cost of health care, a solution emerging 
from policy supporting more CER, and the politics of strong support for health care reform and a 
Democratic majority – historically pro-CER – in both Houses and the Oval Office in one given 
moment. None of these elements were novel, but their contiguity in this moment presented a 
window of opportunity for the government to enact policy for CER. 
 The presentation of this window of opportunity, however, did not mean that legislature 
enacting a greater role for CER was inevitable. The cards were stacked in favor of Democratic 
legislators, and CER was a policy they had historically preferred, and yet the shaping and 
enactment of any public policy is not limited to government officials. In fact, “over the past 10 
years scholars have acknowledged a shift in the nature of policy and policy-making, which 
points to the involvement of a much larger array of actors in the policy process” (Buse, Mays & 
Walt 2005 as cited in Walt, Shiffman, Schneider et al. 2008, 309). These actors, whether 
individuals or organizations, are often referred to as stakeholders, and in health policy debates, 
these stakeholders range from medical professional groups to the pharmaceutical industry and 
are uniquely placed to influence the policy process because of “their knowledge, technology, 
access to political processes and stake in life and death issues” (Walt, Shiffman, Schneider et al 
2008, 308).  
 
 
Methods: Elite Interviews and Gray Literature Review 
 
Given their unique position, policy stakeholders are the focus of both of the methods I 
have used in this project. Specifically, I undertook an analysis of “gray literature” about CER, 
defined as  “that which is produced on all levels of government, academics, business and 
industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by commercial publishers” 
(New Frontiers 1999). I also interviewed elite stakeholders who are representative of key policy 
domains.  
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My gray literature search consists of analysis of reports on CER archived in the New 
York Academy of Medicine’s Gray Literature Report (http://nyam.waldo.kohalibrary.com/) and 
through PolicyFile.com. The initial searches returned 74 results, and of those twenty-five met 
initial inclusion criteria and fourteen were included in the final analysis. Analyzing these reports 
allowed me to develop, test and refine hypotheses and to establish both who should be 
interviewed and what questions were most salient to the debate about CER.  I also analyzed 
these data using Aberbach’s and Rockman’s (2002) coding framework. More detailed 
information on the methods and results of this search are included in Appendix 1: Gray 
Literature Search. 
The purpose of my stakeholder interviews was to “acquire information and context that 
only that person [could] provide” (Hochschild 2005, 1).  I chose the interview respondents to 
reflect a diversity of viewpoints representative of the various stakeholders in the debate about 
CER. Background research into this debate mentioned numerous and varied important 
stakeholders. In light of this diversity of opinions, the structure of the PCORI Board of Governors 
served as a guidepost for which stakeholders were most commonly thought to be important to 
this discussion. The twenty-one member governing board for PCORI includes individuals meant 
to represent consumers, hospitals, industry, nurses, payers, physicians, researchers, surgeons, 
and two government agencies: the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  
To reflect these stakeholder views, ten individuals were contacted for interview. Two 
never replied, one refused to be interviewed, and seven agreed to be interviewed. 
Unfortunately, I could not resolve a scheduling conflict with one of those seven, but the other six 
were interviewed between May 17th and June 22nd. All interviews took place over the phone; 
interviews lasted between 17 and 52 minutes depending on how much time respondents were 
able to give and what they wished to convey. This information is also presented in Appendix 2:  
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Interview Respondents and Positions.  
The interviews consisted of numerous open-ended questions that elicited the 
respondents’ opinions on the history of CER, the recent debate about CER and various aspects 
of the new Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, including how future CER results 
would be used. I used open-ended questions for three reasons. First, open-ended questions 
permit responses that are sufficiently focused and broad as to allow for the emergence of 
previously unknown themes (Brugha & Varvasovszky 2000b). Second, open-ended questions 
permit respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks, increasing the 
validity of their responses (Aberbach & Rockman 2002). Finally, previous research suggests 
that elite stakeholders are more receptive to open rather than closed-ended questions 
(Aberbach & Rockman 2002). A full list of the interview questions is included in Appendix 3: 
Interview Questions.  
The UNC IRB judged the interviews to be exempt from further review, and I obtained 
verbal consent from each participant to record, transcribe, and include their responses in my 
analysis. One respondent declined to have the interview recorded, but allowed me to take 
notes, quote her and attribute information both to her name and title. The rest of the 
respondents agreed to have the interview recorded with full permission to quote and attribute 
quotations.  
Later, I alone transcribed interview recordings into written documents. Each respondent 
was given the opportunity to review the notes or transcripts of his or her interview and to correct 
for transcription errors or disallow use of any or all content. In the process of transcription, I 
opted to use “denaturalized transcripts” in which the “uhs,” “ums” and repeat words were 
eliminated in the final transcript (Oliver, Serovich, & Mason 2005). I did this for two reasons:  
first, I was more interested in the informational content of the interviews than in the speech 
patterns of the respondents; and second, the interview respondents agreed to be identified by 
name and title, and I found it more professional to correct those idiosyncrasies of speech that 
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are less common in written works. Finally, I analyzed the data by identifying the portion of each 
interview that pertained to the following topics: the history and historical roots of CER, the 
debate about CER prior to the Affordable Care Act and the use of CER results. Then, I compiled 
and analyzed the data across all interviews for each topic.   
Before offering my conclusions from the research, I would like to clarify the limitations of 
this kind of study. First, because the study is based on the responses of a small number of 
individuals, if those individuals are not representative of the population being studied, the results 
may be biased. Furthermore, this means that the data from which to draw conclusions and with 
which I develop complex relationships is somewhat limited. Finally, this qualitative research 
cannot definitively define relationships of cause and effect. To make up for these shortcomings, 
I attempted to contact a representative sample of stakeholders with a broad array of expertise, 
and I allowed respondents to develop their own responses to open-ended questions, so as not 
to limit the type or amount of data collected. I also triangulated my results by using a second 
method of research, reviewing gray literature reports. This allowed me to test whether and the 
degree to which results from each method converged on the same answer.  
 
 
The Compromises that Made PCORI and its Uncertain Future 
 
Support for CER and specifically the establishment of PCORI was very broad…Now 
that’s not to say that everyone who supported this outcome, PCORI, agreed with 
everything that ended up being in the final language that was enacted into law. It was 
undoubtedly a compromise measure as most are as they go through the legislative 
process. 
 - Bart Barefoot, Director of Public Policy, GlaxoSmithKline 
 
A broad range of stakeholders agreed on the need for federal support for comparative 
effectiveness research (CER), but no single individual, group or coalition led the charge (Rich 
2009, Bernstein 2009, Orszag 2007, Russo 2009, Pearson 2009). In fact, each of six interview 
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respondents indicated a different set of stakeholders as the most influential. When asked, their 
responses included the President and his staff, health economists, clinician groups and even, 
interestingly, some individuals in favor of limited government.  Each of these groups had a 
slightly different hope for CER beyond the unifying goal of cost containment. Dr. Gail Wilensky, 
senior fellow at Project Hope, counted herself among the latter group, who envisioned CER as 
the route to “better information and better incentives as the way to keep some of the direct 
control by government at bay.” On the other hand, Dr. Debra Barksdale, a member of the 
PCORI board of governors and Associate Professor at the UNC School of Nursing, believed 
CER would diminish the level of health disparities by ensuring that all groups of people received 
the best possible care. The diversity of these goals, as well as differences of opinion regarding 
the ultimate use of CER, led to numerous compromises during the creation of PCORI which 
create more questions regarding its future than many proponents would have expected.  
In the debate leading up to the Affordable Care Act, proponents of CER originally 
advertised it as having the potential to reduce the country’s rising health care costs. In fact, 
drawing on The National Priorities Partnership’s estimation of the cost of medical overuse, 
proponents were able to put a number to their estimated savings. They claimed that 30 percent 
of health care spending – $600 to 700 billion – is unnecessary and wasteful (National Priorities 
Partnership). CER, they argued, could elucidate which treatments were most effective and 
which were less so.  
This claim was not new. In fact, it was originally based on research indicating that 
medical practice varied between geographically diverse areas (Chassin, Kosecoff et al 1987; 
Wennberg & Gittelsohn 1982), and more recent research indicated that those geographical 
differences remained (Song, Skinner et al 2010).2 They argued that “expanded research on 
comparative effectiveness, if linked to changes in incentives for providers and patients, offers a 
                                                          
2
 They were validated by research that came out two months after the passage of the Affordable Care Act 
that indicated regional variations had not changed demonstrably in the intervening decades (Song, 
Skinner et al 2010). 
9 
 
promising mechanism for reducing health care costs to a significant degree over the long term 
while maintaining or improving the health of Americans” (Orszag 2007a, 20). 
Opponents of CER, however, saw any link between federally supported research and 
potential changes in coverage and reimbursement as problematic. As the Director of Public 
Policy at GlaxoSmithKline Mr. Bart Barefoot explained “the opposition was primarily one rooted 
in ideology, of persons and groups who have a concern about the role of the federal 
government in our daily lives and in particular in the payment for and delivery of health care.”  
Dr. Gail Wilensky added that the opposition’s fears were enhanced by the events of the time. In 
her words: 
The context in which [CER] came up made it a lightning rod for controversy because it 
was in a period where not only under health care reform but the whole larger debate 
about the appropriate role of government was going on… where you had government 
now involved in the propping up of banks, the automobile industry and various other 
sectors of the economy that had not previously had direct involvement. [CER] is 
regarded as one more intrusive or potentially intrusive intervention and therefore might 
have sparked more controversy than had it been in a different era or just a different time 
period.  
 
These concerns were also reflected in the gray literature review, in which two authors argued for 
greater provision of incentives for the private market to perform CER3. They posited that “a 
better way to generate comparative-effectiveness information would be to undo the series of 
government missteps that suppresses the market’s ability to create and use this important 
research” (Cannon 2009, 12).   
In response to these concerns, many proponents changed their message regarding 
CER, moderating the claim that CER would save money.  According to Dr. Eugene Rich, Senior 
Fellow at Mathematica and Director of its Center on Health Care Effectiveness:  
                                                          
3
 The two works espousing the view that the private market should be incentivized to carry out CER are 
(1) Cannon MF. A Better Way to Generate and Use Comparative-Effectiveness Research; Cato Institute. 
2009:1-24 and (2) Gottlieb S. Promoting and Using Comparative Research: What Are the Promises and 
Pitfalls of a New Federal Effort?; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 2009. I discuss 
them in greater detail in Appendix 1: Gray Literature Search.  
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Later on in the debate, as that conversation became so instantly tied to rationing and 
stoked fears that effective but expensive innovations would be made unavailable by 
CER, I think the conversation turned toward increasing value, which is sort of harder to 
complain about. 
 
This change in message is reflected in the legislation for PCORI in two ways.  
First, PCORI is prohibited from using cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA) in its research. 
CEA, unlike CER, measures the value per dollar spent of a given treatment using units such as 
quality-adjusted life years. In truth, incorporating CEA into the work of PCORI was probably not 
politically feasible. When asked how things might have played out if CEA were included in the 
legislation, Dr. Gail Wilensky said simply that “it would be even more controversial,” and Dr. 
Eugene Rich responded tongue-in-cheek. “You couldn’t get 60 senators to vote in favor of 
rationing.” Echoing these sentiments, Mr. Bart Barefoot felt the separation of CEA and CER was 
the right choice. Other stakeholders, however, took this bow to political pressure less calmly. 
One respondent described the prohibition on CEA as “a crazy notion” and claimed that its 
prohibition “shows the degree to which this whole scientific and technical debate has gotten 
perverted by politics.”  
Regardless of this prohibition, most stakeholders agreed that CEA using PCORI’s 
research findings would be performed by someone.  Mr. Bart Barefoot: 
The fact of the matter is that cost is a key factor in health care decision making…The 
patients have cost data. They can and, we anticipate, will marry the clinical effectiveness 
data that they get from PCORI with their specific cost data to essentially do a cost-
effectiveness analysis.” 
 
Dr. Debra Barksdale and Dr. Gail Wilensky felt similarly, suggesting that although it had no 
place in PCORI’s agenda, someone would most likely perform the back-end analyses that 
married PCORI’s work to cost. The degree to which this occurs may have important 
consequences for how well CER lives up to its promise to lower the rate of health care spending 
growth.  
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 The second compromise in the legislation for PCORI was its prohibition on the group to 
make coverage or reimbursement suggestions. This decision, too, can be seen as a response 
to conservative fears over rationing, though it was also spurred by the dilemma faced by 
AHCPR in the mid 1990’s.4 Much like with the separation of CEA and CER, though, many 
stakeholders see the use of PCORI research to make coverage and reimbursement decisions 
as inevitable. In this research, five of six interview respondents and eight of fourteen gray 
literature reports agreed that such changes were likely. Dr. William Roper, for one, welcomed 
these changes, saying:   
That’s what’s up for grabs. People are diving under the table and saying, “we will never 
ration health care,” and I just laugh when they say that. Of course we will ration care. I 
hope we ration it even more than we already are, but we have for decades rationed care. 
I think it would be much better if we rationed it in public, driven by evidence, and [CER] 
is the best tool for rationing that we have.   
 
Furthermore, many stakeholders hold to the view that tying CER to changes in incentives, 
reimbursement or coverage is the best way to ensure that health care costs go down (Orszag 
2007), which was the initial driving force behind CER proposals.  
The final compromise in the CER legislation deals with its ongoing engagement with the 
stakeholder community. PCORI’s twenty-one member Board of Governors5 includes 
representatives from each stakeholder group. It replaces the Federal Coordinating Council for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, an intra-governmental entity established under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which got caught up in antigovernment rhetoric 
(Rich & Docteur 2010). According to Mr. Bart Barefoot: 
The structure really is the only way that Congress could have gone to actually establish 
this organization. To have all the key stakeholders around the table to be able to express 
their voice, to provide their expertise, to listen, to share concerns, to bring their various 
perspectives, I think it was an absolute necessity to have a broad-based, broadly 
representative board for the creation of PCORI. 
                                                          
4
 For more on the fate of AHCPR see above Introduction: History Behind the Current Debate About CER. 
5
 Duties of the Board of Governors include are described as follows “carrying out research projects that 
provide quality, relevant evidence on how diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can effectively 
and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, monitored, and managed” (GAO) 
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Though meant to capture broad stakeholder support, Dr. Eugene Rich suggested that it might 
not be achieving its aim. “One certainly has continued to see a lot of political positioning around 
comparative effectiveness research.” In a similar manner, PCORI’s activities are designed to be 
inclusive so as to maintain broad support. According to Dr. Debra Barksdale, those activities 
have thus far included numerous public meetings in cities ranging from Washington D.C. to Los 
Angeles, with live webcast and support for public call-in or write-in questions. Furthermore, all 
decisions are open to public comment for 45 days by statute. These efforts, she hopes, will 
“capture stakeholder support” and legitimize PCORI’s results. 
 In total, these legislative compromises may reflect the only manner in which proponents 
could achieve the realization of a new entity to perform CER. However, they also indicate that 
PCORI’s future has many questions. On the positive side, proponents of PCORI succeeded in 
placing it outside of the government agency hierarchy and the appropriations process. This 
placement buffers PCORI from the political vicissitudes that influenced the fate of AHCPR6. Yet, 
among the stakeholders interviewed, many questioned PCORI’s funding. Its budget for 2010-
2012 is $120 million reaching an annual amount of nearly $500 million by 2015.7  Dr. Gail 
Wilensky criticized the funding as “not close” to what was needed, especially in comparison to 
the roughly $30 billion per year the National Institute of Health receives for biomedical science 
research. Peter Hussey, a Policy Researcher at RAND, agreed that PCORI was underfunded, 
and he went a step further, suggesting that PCORI may not last.  
We’ll see how the program plays out, but it’s under so much scrutiny. The funding level 
is probably too low.  It’s probably too prescriptive already.  It’s probably one of the first 
                                                          
6
 For more on the fate of AHCPR see above Introduction: History Behind the Current Debate About CER. 
7
 The Institute will be funded through the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF), 
which will consist of the following funding streams: for 2010-2012, PCORI funding will amount to $210 
million from general revenues; for 2013, PCORI funding will be general revenues of $150 million plus an 
annual $1 fee per Medicare  
beneficiary transferred from the Medicare Trust Fund plus a $1 fee per individual assessed on private 
health plans; for 2014-2019, PCORI funding will be general revenues of $150 million plus a $2 fee per 
Medicare beneficiary plus a $2 fee per privately insured individual. By 2015, total annual funding for the 
Institute will reach nearly $500 million (Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 2010). 
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targets – especially if they come out with anything slightly controversial – that’ll get 
slashed.  
 
This possibility is worrisome for proponents of CER and supporters of PCORI. Though, 
even if it did not get cut, many stakeholders fear that PCORI will not make a discernible 
difference to the way health care is delivered. Dr. William Roper worried that without specific 
connections between PCORI’s research and changes in coverage, reimbursement or incentives 
little would change. He cited the outcries to changes in mammography guidelines as indicative 
of the public’s refusal to be guided by expert opinion.8  Dr. Peter Hussey, on the other hand, 
suggested that even if PCORI’s research does affect coverage and reimbursement decisions, it 
probably would not have significant effects on spending, access, or quality of care delivered. 
However, not all of stakeholder opinion is pessimistic, and the establishment of PCORI 
may indicate a shift in public and political acceptance of CER.  Dr. William Roper, for one, sees 
PCORI as a measure of CER’s growing legitimacy in the stakeholder arena. “The notion of 
using information that’s available to measure results and try to change and improve in the health 
care system was a pretty fragile notion then [in the late 1980’s], but a much more robust notion 
today.” Similarly, Mr. Bart Barefoot sees the funding of PCORI as merely “seed money” along 
the route to a more “comprehensive CER enterprise that will take hold and over time become 
…what we call a learning health care system.”   
Mr. Bart Barefoot is joined by numerous stakeholders in the belief that PCORI 
represents just a step in a larger process (Conway & Clancy 2009), but where this path leads 
and how PCORI will answer the numerous questions surrounding its goals and activities remain 
to be seen. How it defines CER, what is included in its research portfolio, what methods it 
adopts, and how research findings are disseminated will all affect whether PCORI is a short-
                                                          
8
 In reference to the public’s reaction to changes in mammography guidelines, Roper commented that 
“they don’t care what experts say, and they’re not going to be guided by experts” 
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lived entity hampered by controversy or a positive step toward a more comprehensive and 
evidenced-based health care system.  
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Appendix 1: Gray Literature Search 
 
Introduction 
 
I performed a gray literature search for CER and a content analysis on the results in order to 
better ascertain how CER was addressed by stakeholder organizations during the lead up to the 
Affordable Care Act9. I hoped to determine which themes and messages were most commonly 
cited in the discussion of CER. This goal was heavily influenced by policy literature suggesting 
that the voice of elite stakeholders, as opposed to the voice of the public, would shape the 
debate about CER. In describing this concept, Elmer Eric Schattschneider explained that those 
groups with high levels of support and resources held the greatest public influence. In his words, 
"the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class 
accent.” (Schattschneider 1960, 35). This general concept is no less true now than when it was 
written. The elite have the most influence. This is especially true in debates over health care 
policies in which the stakeholders, ranging from medical professional groups to the 
pharmaceutical industry, have greater “knowledge, technology, access to political processes 
and stake in life and death issues” than does the public or other influences (Walt, Shiffman, 
Schneider et al 2008, 308). 
Because various stakeholders do not always agree, each attempts to shape the debate 
about health policy by controlling the messages and framework within which policy debates 
occur. Stakeholder organizations do so because “one’s frame in thought can have a marked 
impact on one’s overall opinion.” Thus, they attempt to garner the public and policy makers’ 
support “by encouraging them to think about those policies along particular lines,” and they 
                                                          
9
 Searching gray literature for references to CER was originally meant to serve two purposes: to 
understand the frameworks within which stakeholder groups talked about CER and also to show which 
organizations were most actively discussing CER prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act. 
Unfortunately, the search returned a more limited set of results than would be necessary to properly map 
which organizations were most actively addressing the debate about CER. Therefore, the latter goal was 
not achieved. 
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accomplish this “by highlighting certain features of the policy, such as its likely effects or its 
relationship to important values” (Chong & Druckman 2007, 106).  The goal of this literature 
review, then, is to better understand which messages, themes and frames the elite stakeholders 
employed to shape the debate about CER. 
Methods 
 
To develop a search strategy, I consulted with the University of North Carolina’s Health 
Sciences Library staff, who suggested that I use the following databases: the New York 
Academy of Medicine, PolicyFile, and the National Library of Medicine Gateway. Into each of 
these databases, I entered the following input as a keyword “comparative effectiveness 
research”. Results were limited to those published or released after 2006, but prior to the 
passage of the Affordable Care Act on March 23rd 2010 so that results reflected the most 
current ideas and themes surrounding CER. Books and journal or periodical articles were 
excluded from review, and only results published in English were accepted. 
The first step in reviewing these reports was a title assessment. Those titles that 
indicated a report that clearly did not address the policy of CER (as opposed to actual CER 
research) or that clearly did not focus on the American health care system were excluded.10 
When titles alone did not conclusively answer these questions, I kept the report for futher 
review.  The abstracts or summaries of the remaining reports were then reviewed with the same 
criteria. At this point, those reports that were not available were also excluded.  
 
 
                                                          
10
 An example of an article not included based on the title alone would be “Is employer-based health 
insurance a barrier to entrepreneurship?”. 
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Limitations 
Systematically reviewing gray literature for authors’ and organizations’ opinions on CER has 
several limitations. First and foremost, the literature is not easily available. Few engines cater 
specifically to gray literature searches of medical and health services topics, and those that do 
are often incomplete. More general internet search engines (e.g. Google, Yahoo, etc.) could 
have been incorporated to supplement the original search strategies, but time constraints limited 
my ability to sift through the results of such searches. Second, the overlap of some authors and 
organizations in this specific search (Peter Orszag wrote two of the reports and two were 
published in a larger pamphlet published by the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at 
Brookings jointly with The Hamilton Project) may have biased the results of the review. Finally, 
the use of reports to generate more broad conclusions regarding stakeholder sentiment toward 
CER misses those opinions promoted by stakeholders who are not seeking to publish their 
ideas but rather are working through different channels (e.g. lobbying, advocating publicly). 
 Nevertheless, the systematic review does offer some insight into the question, “How 
were stakeholders addressing and framing the debate about CER prior to the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act?” Generally, results indicate a more positive than negative outlook toward 
the potential of CER to improve care and help contain the growing costs of health care in the 
United States. In the following sections, I will discuss in greater depth the results of the search 
and coding of the literature. In greater detail, I will discuss the positive and negative aspects of 
CER according to the gray literature as well as two of the more contentious questions of the 
debate: what should the government’s role be in promoting CER and how will results affect 
reimbursement and coverage decisions. 
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Results 
 
Results of the Gray Literature Search 
 
The first search was performed using the New York Academy of Medicine Gateway 
(http://nyam.waldo.kohalibrary.com/) on 4-7-2011. I entered “comparative effectiveness research” 
into the engine as a single keyword. This search yielded 62 total returns. Of those 62 returns, 43 
were excluded based on their titles or their indicated date of publication, leaving 19 results for 
abstract review. Of these 19 reports, 3 did not pertain to CER, 2 were books, and 1 was 
unavailable which left 13 reports for review.   
The second search used the search engine on PolicyFile (www.policyfile.com) and took 
place on 4-7-2011. I entered “comparative effectiveness research” into the search engine as a 
single keyword, and limited results to those between 1-1-2006 and 3-23-2010. This strategy 
yielded 12 results. Of these results, all were available and pertained to CER policy. Review of 
abstracts indicated that 6 results were duplicates of results found in previous searches, 1 was 
merely a pointer to another article revealed in the search, and 1 was a summary of a previously 
returned report, leaving only four results from the PolicyFile search for further review. 
My third search was of the data in the National Library of Medicine Gateway. I performed 
it on 3-17-2011, and my strategy, although ultimately unsuccessful, was meant to identify gray 
literature.  Using “comparative effectiveness research” as a keyword, this database returned 
18893 results, including 16986 journal citations and abstracts, 269 books, AVs and serials, 1446 
biomedical books, 190 toxicology citations, 1 developmental and reproductive toxicology report 
and 1 meeting abstract. Of these many results, the meeting abstract was the only potential 
report for inclusion, but review of the abstract revealed that the meeting took place prior to 2006.  
In total, the three searches yielded 17 reports for full review. I read the results to assure 
that they were pertinent to CER policymaking; and this step enabled me to eliminate three 
additional reports from the final analysis. One discussed CER’s use in other countries, another 
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was limited to CER in the state of Massachusetts, and the last discussed only the role of cost or 
cost effectiveness in comparative effectiveness research. The final analysis included fourteen 
reports from a variety of sources. The majority of the reports were written by non-governmental 
organizations with a history of interest in public health policy (e.g. Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation); two results were published by the 
Congressional Budget Office. Results of the searches are presented in Table 1. 
After assessing each result for appropriateness to the topic, I reread each report in order 
to develop a coding strategy. I decided to use a thematic content analysis strategy because it 
allowed me to go beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts but 
rather to examine the meanings, themes and patterns present (Zhang & Wildemuth 2009; 
Macnamara 2006). Thus, I derived coding themes directly and inductively from the raw data 
(Zhang & Wildemuth 2009; Hsieh & Shannon 2005; Chong & Druckman 2007). I analyzed and 
coded results for the presence or absence of the themes listed below and for the main theme of 
the report.  
Results of Inductive Coding 
For the first category, presence or absence of particular themes, the document must 
clearly espouse that view to be counted as present, not just mention it as the argument of the 
opposition. The themes that emerged from the data included the following: 
(1) That CER will lower the costs of the American health care system or will increase the 
“efficiency” of the health care system 
(2) That CER will improve upon the problem of geographic variation and/or unnecessary 
treatments 
(3) That CER will increase doctor’s knowledge or will improve patient care 
(4) That CER will change insurance companies’ coverage or reimbursement of certain 
drugs  
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a. That changes in coverage and reimbursement may limit drug availability for 
some populations, harming some who would otherwise benefit from those 
drugs 
(5) That CER will hurt future drug and device development 
 
The results of coding for the presence or absence of specific themes are presented in Table 2, 
in which a “1” indicates the presence of that theme and a blank indicates the absence of that 
theme (see Table 3 for examples of text indicating a given theme). The summated results and 
percentage of reports endorsing each theme are presented in the bottom row of the table.  
The first three themes treat CER positively, and the last two themes frame CER in a 
negative light. The fourth theme – that CER would change reimbursement or coverage of 
certain drugs or devices – can be either a positive or negative aspect of CER, so it was further 
qualified by whether or not the authors suggested such a change would hurt a subgroup of 
individuals for whom the limited drug was in fact beneficial.  This sub-categorization was meant 
to help distinguish those reports in which the author was making the argument that limiting 
drugs would be necessary to cost-containment, and thus a positive, as opposed to those 
authors who suggested limited availability to be a detriment to the health of patients. Finally, the 
results of coding for the main theme or idea of each report are presented in Table 4 and are 
accompanied by one or more quotations that support my conclusions as to the main idea of that 
report. Ideally, coding would also be performed by a second social science researcher whose 
results would be used to judge the validity, reliability and reproducibility of the coding scheme. 
Unfortunately, given limited time and resources, the use of a second reader was not possible by 
the time of this paper’s production. 
24 
 
Promoting CER but with Careful Guidance  
The first three, pro-CER themes were endorsed most frequently, with the single most 
common being that CER would be generally beneficial to patient care by helping providers and 
patients to choose among treatment options (86% of reports). The next most frequent theme 
was that CER would improve upon the inefficiencies or lower the costs of the current health care 
system (79% of reports). Finally, the third pro-CER concept, that CER would reduce 
geographical variation, was endorsed by eight of fourteen (57%) of reports.  
Among the fourteen reports, half endorsed all three of the pro-CER themes. 
Furthermore, of those reports in which the first three, pro-CER themes were present, only one 
also endorsed either of the two clearly con-CER themes. This homogeneity suggests that CER 
became a highly polarized issue among stakeholder organizations. More importantly, the fact 
that the pro-CER themes were this common would suggest that a large proportion of the 
organizations producing reports believed increasing the role of CER in the health care system 
would be beneficial. 
The most common main idea of the seemingly pro-CER reports was that CER had a lot 
of potential, but that realizing this potential would require careful guidance and implementation 
of CER studies and results. This concept is summed up best by McClellan and Benner in their 
report for the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings and The Hamilton Project.  
“For CER to make a substantial, positive contribution to reforming health care, the critical 
implementation issues of prioritizing CER spending to “high-value” studies, creating an efficient 
research infrastructure, and creating an environment that promotes the effective use of 
evidence from CER must be addressed” (2009, 14).  
Similar sentiments were expressed by each of the other pro-CER reports and by some 
of the reports that were not as clearly in favor of the promotion of CER. For example, the reports 
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published by the Institute of Health Economics (IHE)11 and by the New England Healthcare 
Institute (NEHI)12 were more moderate in tone and seemed to be conglomerates of information 
produced by other sources. To wit, the report by the IHE relied heavily upon other reports 
published by the Congressional Budget Office, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
and by authors in the field of health policy. Similarly, the report by the NEHI derived from 
interviews and roundtable discussions with expert stakeholders, and it focused specifically on 
how CER would affect biomedical innovation. The author’s stance toward CER in these papers 
was less apparent than was the stance taken by other authors; however, they nonetheless drive 
home the message that any advancement of CER must be accompanied by careful oversight. In 
fact, of the fourteen reports, five have this or a similar message as the main theme of their 
report.  
Finally, negativity toward CER was rare. Only the report published by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research13 was truly negative toward CER as a concept.  In this report, the 
authors performed economic analyses by modeling demand shifts and treatment effects in 
public and private insurance markets based on changes in coverage due to CER. Their 
analyses suggested that in our current market system CER might adversely affect both patient 
health and spending on health care. Again, though, the authors point out that with care and 
consideration, CER may have a role to play in future health care endeavors. In their words, 
“simplistic thinking about the impact of traditionally perceived CER may have adverse effects. 
However, this does not mean that CER may not have a useful role to play and that good forms 
of CER should not take place” (Basu & Philipson 2010, 28). Therefore, the reports seem to 
indicate a broad support for CER so long as it is accompanied by careful oversight.  
                                                          
11 Comparative Effectiveness: An Overview. Institute of Health Economics. 2009;(February). 
12
 Balancing Act: Comparative Effectiveness Research and Innovation in U.S. Health Care. New England 
Healthcare Institute (NEHI); 2009. 
13
 Basu A, Philipson TJ. The Impact of Comparative Effectiveness Research on Health and Health Care 
Spending. 2010:1-32. 
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The Government’s Role in Promoting CER 
 The role the government should play in promoting CER was one of the more contentious 
questions in the recent debate. This question may seem to be late happening after the fact, 
considering that the government passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act which 
put $1.1 billion into supporting future CER. However, with the looming health care reform 
offering the possibilities of more money for CER and maybe even a new CER entity, this debate 
continued to hold center stage for many organizations. In the results of this systematic review, 
seven reports discussed the role the government should play in CER. Five endorsed 
government promotion of CER to one degree or another14, and two just as firmly insisted that 
CER should be performed by private organizations15.   
Many reasons were given for why the government should take a larger role in the 
promotion of CER. In his report detailing options for expanding the role of CER, Peter Orszag, 
director of the Congressional Budget Office, argued that the private market was not incentivized 
to produce CER given that it was costly to produce and easily disseminated. In his words, a 
private entity would have only “a limited incentive to produce information that could benefit many 
entities” (2007, 3) and thus would “probably not produce as much research on comparative 
                                                          
14 The following articles endorsed the government’s support or funding of a new CER entity:  
(1) Bernstein J. The Facts about Comparative Effectiveness Research.; 2009.  
(2) Orszag PR. Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments: Options for an 
Expanded Federal Role. Health (San Francisco). 2007. Report to the Subcommittee on Health 
under the Committee on Ways and Means, part of the U.S. House of Representatives.  
(3) Comparative Effectiveness: An Overview. Institute of Health Economics. 2009;(February).  
(4) Russo M. The $ 3 Trillion Question: What Health Care Reform Can Save For Families, Businesses 
and Taxpayers; 2009.  
(5) Pearson S. From Better Evidence to Better Care: Using Comparative Effectiveness Research to 
Guide Practice and Policy. Implementing Comparative Effectiveness Research: Priorities, Methods, 
and Impact. 2009:55-76. 
15 Those who supported allowing the private market to perform and distribute CER findings included:  
(1) Cannon MF. A Better Way to Generate and Use Comparative-Effectiveness Research; 2009:1-24. 
(2) Gottlieb S. Promoting and Using Comparative Research: What Are the Promises and Pitfalls of a 
New Federal Effort?; 2009. 
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effectiveness as society would value” (2007, 6). In The Facts about Comparative Effectiveness 
Research, Jeffrey Bernstein explained that the private market performers of CER are funded by 
drug and device manufacturers, which leads them to produce biased results. He posited that 
“CER [should] be funded by neutral parties who do not have an economic interest in the result,” 
which necessitated that “the federal government should expand its funding and support for 
comparative effectiveness research” (2009, 2). Finally, Michael Russo applauded individual 
efforts to produce CER, but saw them as lacking in the coordination that a federal entity could 
provide. “The country’s ailing health care system lacks a coordinated, national effort to support 
comparative effectiveness research aimed at discovering which treatments work best” (2009, 
12-13). Taken together, the reports offered ethical and logistical arguments for why the 
government should support CER. 
In opposition, stakeholders who were against government support of a new CER entity 
believed that market forces could provide the same information more efficiently. In his article A 
Better Way to Generate and Use Comparative-Effectiveness Research, Michael Cannon 
postulated that a federal CER agency would lead to rationing, and that the government 
produces ineffective agencies. In his words, “a better way to generate comparative-
effectiveness information would be to undo the series of government missteps that suppresses 
the market’s ability to create and use this important research” (2009, 12).  Similarly, Scott 
Gottlieb argues that “like many other seductively simple ideas, enthusiasm for comparative 
effectiveness research (CER) outpaces its practical promise and obscures the downside of 
having governments take on these sorts of studies and the clinical considerations that go into 
them” (2009, 1). More specifically, he argues that the government’s track record with CER, seen 
through the ALLHAT and CATIE trials16, indicates a propensity to make coverage decisions 
without rigorous evidence. Instead, Gottlieb argues that efforts be made to “leverage CER being 
                                                          
16
 According to Scott Gottlieb, these are two large trials in which the researchers came to the conclusion, 
prematurely, that newer, more expensive drugs were no better than existing medicines. In each case, the 
initial conclusion was reviewed and changed. 
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done by private groups, as well as to create more incentives for companies to undertake this 
kind of scientific work” (2009, 5) before we end up “squarely on a path that more closely 
resembles the process used in Britain—with all its shortcomings on access, innovation, and 
health outcomes” (2009, 7). Taken together, the reports offer arguments for greater efficiency 
and against misuse of the information as reasons to keep the government from having an active 
role in promoting CER.   
In conclusion, the view that the government should support ongoing and future efforts to 
produce CER was more popular than was the view that the private market should furnish such 
information. Furthermore, many reports left this question unremarked, instead treating federal 
support of CER as a given (Balancing Act 2009; Explaining Health Reform 2009). The most 
important question among these reports, then, was where any new CER entity should be 
placed. Bills proposed by Congressional leaders alternatively placed such an entity within the 
purview of AHRQ or outside of the existing structure, to function as a non-profit institute 
governed by a multi-stakeholder board. However, this issue was not widely discussed in the 
reports.  
 
CER and Coverage Decisions: What Would Changes Mean? 
Many stakeholders believe that CER will be used to change coverage and 
reimbursement for certain drugs, devices and procedures. However, whether this is a positive or 
a negative is widely debated, and in this review the issue remained contentious. Eight of 
fourteen reports believed that CER results would be used to change coverage or reimbursement 
of certain treatments. Furthermore, half of those eight believed that such changes would harm 
patients by limiting their access to effective drugs, while half did not endorse this belief.  
Those reports endorsing the belief that CER might lead to harming patients suggested 
that results would not adequately take into account the heterogeneity in patients’ response to 
treatments. They posited that “limits on access to new medical products that are based on 
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assumptions about the cost to a population will also deny access to individuals who can 
nonetheless benefit from the medical product” (Gottlieb 2009, 6). These opponents often 
strengthened their rhetorical argument by likening it to the “rationing” of health care (Cannon 
2009), a stance promoted by Republican leaders and conservative pundits (Iglehart 2010). 
Framing the argument around the concept of rationing allowed these authors to play on extant 
popular sentiment and increase public concern over the use of CER results.  
Proponents of allowing CER to direct changes in coverage and reimbursement, on the 
other hand, suggested that CER would actually ensure that patients were receiving the best 
medical treatment available. They proposed that many treatments currently have no evidentiary 
basis (Docteur & Berenson 2010; Orszag 2007a), and that changes in reimbursement or 
coverage would only reflect greater certainty that one treatment performed better than another. 
Furthermore, they suggested that “expanded research on comparative effectiveness, if linked to 
changes in incentives for providers and patients, offers a promising mechanism for reducing 
health care costs to a significant degree over the long term while maintaining or improving the 
health of Americans” (Orszag 2007a, 20). These reports, however, are split down the middle, 
leading to no simple conclusion as to how CER results will be used or whether they will produce 
the harms feared or benefits hoped for by the various stakeholders. 
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Table 1: Gray Literature Search Results 
*Note that reports were limited to those which (1) were published between 1/1/2006 and 3/23/2010, (2) were considered “gray literature” (i.e. not 
journal articles, periodical articles or books, (3) were focused on the policy of CER.  
For Tables 2 and 4, organizations are abbreviated as follows: 
Families   Families USA 
HJKFF    Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
RWJF    Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
US PIRG EF   United States Public Interest Research Group, Education Fund 
NBER    National Bureau of Economic Research 
Cato    Cato Institute 
AEI    American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 
CBOa    Congressional Budget Organization (Research on… 2007) 
IHE    Institute of Health Economics 
NEHI    New England Healthcare Institute 
US PIRG FS   United States Public Interest Research Group, Federation of State PIRGs 
CBOb    Congressional Budget Office (Letter to… 2007) 
ECHCR & HPa   Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings; The Hamilton Project (McClellan & Benner) 
ECHCR & HPb   Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings; The Hamilton Project (Pearson) 
Search Engine 
Date of 
Search 
Search Input 
Returned 
Articles 
Met Title 
Requirements 
Met Abstract 
Requirements 
Included in Final 
Analysis 
New York Academy 
of Medicine 
Gateway 
4-7-2011 
“Comparative 
Effectiveness Research” 
62 43 19 10 
Policy File 4-7-2011 
“Comparative 
Effectiveness Research” 
12 12 6 4 
National Library of 
Medicine Gateway 
3-17-
2011 
“Comparative 
Effectiveness Research” 
0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 14 
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Table 2: Summary of Themes from Gray Literature Review 
Organization 
Associated with the 
Report 
 
Common Themes 
CER increases 
health system 
efficiency / lowers 
health care costs 
CER reduces 
geographical 
variation 
CER improves 
treatment 
decisions / 
patient care 
CER will change 
coverage or 
reimbursement 
Changes in 
reimbursement / 
coverage would 
harm 
CER will hurt drug 
and device 
development 
Families 
  
1 
 
 
 
HJKFF 1 1 1 
 
 
 
RWJF 1 1 1 
 
 
 
US PIRG EF 1 1 1 
 
 
 
NBER 
   
1 1 
 
Cato 1 1 1 1  
 
AEI 
  
1 1 1 1 
CBOa 1 1 1 1  
 
IHE 1 
 
1 1  1 
NEHI 1 1 1 1 1 1 
US PIRG FS 1 
 
1 
 
 
 
CBOb 1 1 
  
 
 
ECHCR & HPa 1 1 1 1  
 
ECHCR & HPb 1  1 1 1  
Total reports with that 
theme  
(percent of reports with 
that theme) 
11 (79%) 8 (57%) 12 (86%) 8 (57%) 4 (29%) 3 (21%) 
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Table 3: Coding Examples 
 
Theme Example Text 1 Example Text 2 
That CER will lower the 
costs of the American health 
care system or will improve 
“efficiency” of the health 
care system 
“Identifying the most effective and efficient interventions 
has the potential to reduce unnecessary treatments, 
which in turn, may help lower costs” (Explaining 2009, 1) 
“Expanded research on comparative effectiveness, if linked to changes 
in incentives for providers and patients, offers a promising mechanism 
for reducing health care costs to a significant degree over the long term 
while maintaining or improving the health of Americans.” (Orszag 2007, 
20) 
 
That CER will improve upon 
the problem of geographic 
variation and/or 
unnecessary treatment 
“Across the health care system, there is consensus that 
better clinical evidence is needed to support decision 
making at the point of care to reduce variation and 
promote health care quality. This has generated wide 
support for clinical effectiveness studies.” (New England 
Healthcare Institute 2009, 10) 
 
“To improve patient care and reduce the costs of unnecessary and 
improper treatment, the federal government should expand its funding 
and support for comparative effectiveness research.” (Bernstein 2009, 
2) 
 
That CER will increase 
doctor’s knowledge of 
treatment decisions or will 
improve patient care 
“To improve patient care and reduce the costs of 
unnecessary and improper treatment, the federal 
government should expand its funding and support for 
comparative effectiveness research.” (Bernstein 2009, 2) 
“compelling evidence will lead patients and their doctors to make better 
choices among various medical treatments, leading to better outcomes 
and in cases where an equally or more effective treatment may cost 
less lower health care spending” (McClellan & Benner 2009, 8) 
 
That CER will change 
coverage or reimbursement 
of certain drugs 
“If we shift to a system that demands incontrovertible 
proof of superior efficacy through comparative studies 
prior to covering a drug, device, or procedure, the impact 
on access and subsequent innovation would be large.” 
(Gottlieb 2009, 3) 
 
“Conservatives warn that a federal comparative-effectiveness agency 
would lead to government rationing of medical care—indeed, that’s the 
whole idea.” (Cannon 2009, 1) 
That changes in coverage 
and reimbursement may 
limit drug availability for 
some populations who 
would otherwise benefit 
from those drugs 
“Limits on access to new medical products that are based 
on assumptions about the cost to a population will also 
deny access to individuals who can nonetheless benefit 
from the medical product.” (Gottlieb 2009, 6) 
“if the results of a CER study of alternative treatments are strictly 
applied to a broad population—for example, through a decision not to 
cover a treatment based on the CER results—then out- comes may 
worsen for particular patients who, for various reasons such as 
comorbidities, race and ethnicity, genetics, or preferences, may have 
responded better” (McClellan & Benner 2009, 9) 
 
That CER will hurt future 
drug and device 
development 
“CER would lead to slower adoption of effective 
technologies, hinder the discovery of new benefits from 
existing products, and halt investment in novel research.” 
(Gottlieb 2009, 6) 
 
“With CER poised to become a critical tool for improving health care 
decision making and health outcomes, there is a need to balance its 
implementation with its potential impact on the all-important force of 
innovation in health care.” (NEHI 2009, 23) 
 
 
33 
 
Table 4: Main Themes and Quotations from Gray Literature Review 
 
Organization  Main Theme Quotes from the Reports 
Families 
CER leads to improved knowledge 
which can lower racial disparities in 
care 
“Comparative effectiveness research will be used to help providers and patients make more informed 
treatment decisions.” (1) 
 
HJKFF 
CER can be an important 
mechanism in improving quality and 
reducing cost if supported and 
utilized correctly 
“The aim of comparative effectiveness research is to improve health outcomes by developing and 
disseminating evidence- based information to patients, providers, and health care decision-makers about 
the effectiveness of treatments relative to other options. Identifying the most effective and efficient 
interventions has the potential to reduce unnecessary treatments, which in turn, may help lower costs.” (1) 
RWJF 
CER has the potential to help the 
American health care system if done 
correctly 
“In sum, the fears associated with CE are very much related to the potential misuse of information 
developed on comparative effectiveness. They can be averted by recognizing that CE provides useful 
information and valuable input for making decisions that would otherwise be made in the absence of 
information, but that good decisions depend on sound decision making as well as on good input.” (9) 
 
US PIRG EF 
CER will lead to better care and 
reduced cost for the health care 
system 
“Opponents’ claims that CER results in the rationing of health care or a government takeover are belied by 
the true nature of such research: it is simply fundamental scientific research of medical treatments aimed 
at determining the most effective ways to treat sickness and injury. It is the basis of all advancements in 
the field of medical science and has been used throughout history to improve medical treatment.” (1) 
“To improve patient care and reduce the costs of unnecessary and improper treatment, the federal 
government should expand its funding and support for comparative effectiveness research.” (2) 
NBER 
Given the authors’ understanding of 
market forces, CER will lead to 
worse health outcomes at higher cost 
“Overall, our main conclusions from the conceptual analysis is that CER has indeterminate effects on 
spending and patient health and, under natural assumptions on how markets respond to new quality 
information, may even adversely affect both.” (4) 
 
Cato 
CER is a powerful tool, but reform 
should encourage the private sector 
to perform it 
“Government provision of comparative-effectiveness information may do little or nothing to increase 
efficiency compared to a policy of laissez faire” (6) 
 
“Rather than create yet another ineffective government agency, a better way to generate comparative-
effectiveness information would be to undo the series of government missteps that suppresses the 
market’s ability to create and use this important research.” (12) 
 
AEI 
The federal government has a 
troubled history when it comes to 
CER, so we should push for this 
research to be done privately 
instead. 
“like many other seductively simple ideas, enthusiasm for comparative effectiveness research (CER) 
outpaces its practical promise and obscures the downside of having governments take on these sorts of 
studies and the clinical considerations that go into them” (Gottlieb 2009, 1) 
“CER would lead to slower adoption of effective technologies, hinder the discovery of new benefits from 
existing products, and halt investment in novel research.” (Gottlieb 2009, 6) 
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CBOa 
1. CER is a public good that will not 
be created to the extent the public 
would value unless it is supported at 
the federal level. 
 
2. To lower health care costs, 
changes in Medicare need to 
accompany CER research. 
“the private sector will probably not produce as much research on comparative effectiveness as society 
would value. The knowledge created by such studies is costly to produce—but once it is produced, it can 
be disseminated at essentially no additional cost, and limiting that dissemination may be difficult” (Orszag 
2007, 6) 
 
“Expanded research on comparative effectiveness, if linked to changes in incentives for providers and 
patients, offers a promising mechanism for reducing health care costs to a significant degree over the long 
term while maintaining or improving the health of Americans.” (Orszag 2007, 20) 
 
IHE 
There are many issues being 
considered in the development and 
debate about the use of CER in the 
U.S. 
“It is difficult to see how suggestions regarding CE influencing decisions on individual patients are much 
different to what physicians do routinely during their consultations.” (Institute of Health Economics 2009, 
14) 
 
NEHI 
CER has the potential to lower 
geographical variation and improve 
quality, but it must be implemented 
correctly or else it will have 
unintended negative consequences. 
“With CER poised to become a critical tool for improving health care decision making and health 
outcomes, there is a need to balance its implementation with its potential impact on the all-important force 
of innovation in health care.” (NEHI 2009, 23)  
 
“Across the health care system, there is consensus that better clinical evidence is needed to support 
decision making at the point of care to reduce variation and promote health care quality. This has 
generated wide support for clinical effectiveness studies.” (NEHI 2009, 10) 
 
US PIRG FS 
The U.S. needs a coordinated effort 
at producing CER to realize its 
potential for increasing the efficiency 
of the health care system. 
“Adoption of the findings in evidence-based treatment protocols and guidelines can help ensure we are 
paying for the most effective treatments.” (4) 
 
“But while individual efforts are laudable, the country’s ailing health care system lacks a coordinated, 
national effort to support comparative effectiveness research aimed at discovering which treatments work 
best” (Russo 2009, 12-13) 
CBOb 
CER could constrain health care 
costs, but savings would be a long 
time in developing. 
“It would probably be a decade or more before new research on comparative effectiveness had the 
potential to reduce health care spending in a significant way.” (2) 
 
ECHCR & 
HPa 
CER can help bend the cost curve 
but only with careful implementation, 
guidance and dissemination. 
“These diverse views suggest that the ultimate impact of CER for better or worse is very uncertain. The 
key unresolved questions deal with whether CER as it will actually be implemented—and it will— can 
reduce costs and improve outcomes” (9) 
ECHCR & 
HPb 
CER has a lot of potential for 
improving upon geographical 
diversity and inefficiencies in the 
system, but its ultimate effects will 
depend on how it is implemented. 
“for CER to make a substantial, positive contribution to reforming health care, the critical implementation 
issues of prioritizing CER spending to “high-value” studies, creating an efficient research infrastructure, 
and creating an environment that promotes the effective use of evidence from CER must be addressed” 
(14) 
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Appendix 2: Interview Respondents and Positions  
 
Respondent Position Interview Date Interview Length 
Bart Barefoot  Director of Public Policy, GlaxoSmithKline 5/17/11 52 minutes 
William Roper, MD, MPH Dean of the School of Medicine, Vice 
Chancellor for Medical Affairs, and Chief 
Executive Officer - UNC Health Care 
System  
5/23/11 20 minutes 
Debra Barksdale, PhD, RN Associate Professor – UNC School of 
Nursing 
Commissioner – Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute  
5/24/11 19 minutes 
Peter Hussey, PhD Policy Researcher, RAND 6/3/11 18 minutes 
Gail Wilensky, PhD Senior fellow at Project Hope 6/13/11 17 minutes 
Eugene Rich, MD Senior Fellow and Director of 
Mathematica’s Center on Health Care 
Effectiveness 
6/22/11 32 minutes 
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Appendix 3: Interview Questions 
 
I’ve done my best to learn about the history and debate over CER by reading published 
articles and reports, but I want and need your own expert perspective on the history of CER 
and the debate over CER in recent health care reform.  
 
So, in your opinion, when it was first proposed in the late 1980’s, what were the most 
important influences pushing CER forward? 
 
When this process started, what would you say people thought the outcome would 
look like? 
 
How would you describe the trajectory of CER since then? 
 
Thank you. And now, I’d also like your view on how the recent CER debate played out. 
 
What was your own organization’s position regarding CER at the beginning of the 
discussion for health care reform? 
 
In your opinion, who would you say were the most influential stakeholders in the 
debate?  
 
How did they influence the debate over CER? 
 
How would you describe the coalitions that formed around support and opposition? 
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What do you think proponents thought would be the single biggest benefit of CER? 
 
And what about the opponents?  What was the thing they feared most about CER? 
 
Is there anything else I'm missing about the debate over CER?   
 
The Affordable Care Act created the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
(PCORI).  As you know, the PCORI will be responsible for coordinating a major new national 
push on CER.  
 
How familiar are you with the planning for the actual implementation of the PCORI? 
 
PCORI is supposed to generate research findings.  How do you think the results of 
this research will be used? 
 
Do you happen to know how broadly the proposed structure of the board was 
discussed in the stakeholder community while the Affordable Care Act was being 
debated? 
 
Do you think this particular board structure will capture support for PCORI from all its 
stakeholders, even the ones who might be concerned about the uses of CER 
research?   
 
Do you think PCORI’s funding realistically will be enough to achieve its aims? 
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As you know, some people have been concerned that PCORI research will be seized 
on to change coverage and reimbursement.  Some people think that’s a good thing, 
and other people are worried about this.  How likely do you think that is, and what do 
you think its consequences will be?    
 
Thank you so much for your time. We are almost done. I just have a couple more questions. 
One provision of the health reform legislation’s treatment of CER is that it prohibits the use 
of cost effectiveness. How do you think that prohibition on cost effectiveness will affect the 
utility of what CER can produce?   
 
What do you think would change if CER could include cost effectiveness analyses? 
 
Thank you so very much for your time and thoughts!  Do you have any additional questions 
or comments?  Would you like a copy of this interview once it is transcribed?  Thank you 
again! 
 
 
